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Abstract
This paper studies the Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM), a two in one product: a
fixed rate home loan coupled with negative equity insurance, to advocate its viability in
mitigating financial fragility. In order to tackle the many issues that CWMs embrace, we
perform a range of tasks. We optimally price CWMs and take a systemic market-based
approach, stipulating that mortgage values and payments should be linked to housing
prices and adjusted downward to prevent negative equity. We illustrate that amortizing
CWMs can be the efficient home financing choice for many households. We price CWMs
as American option style, defaulting debt in conjunction with prepayment within a con-
tinuous time, analytic framework. We introduce random prepayments via the intensity
approach of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). We also model the optimal embedded option to
default whose exercise is motivated by decreasing random house prices. We adapt the
Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) (BAW) approach to work within amortizing mortgage
context. We derive new closed-form and new analytical approximation methodologies
which apply both for pricing CWMs, as well as for pricing the standard US 30-year Fixed
Rate Mortgage (FRM).
Keywords: Negative equity; House price index indexation; Repayment mortgage; Insur-
ance; Embedded option to default; Prepayment intensity.
JEL: C63, D11, D14, D92, G13, G21, R31.
“Because [systemic] risk cannot be diversified away, investors demand a risk premium if they are
exposed to it. There is no magic potion that can mitigate this kind of risk: somebody must hold this
risk. Because crisis risk is endemic, it cannot be diversified away. To off-load this kind of risk, you
have to purchase insurance, that is, induce others to take the risk off your hands by paying them a
risk premium.”
Jonathan Berk, in Fabozzi et al., 2010, page 127
1 Introduction
The ad hoc measures taken to resolve the subprime crisis involved expending financial
resources to bail out banks without addressing the wave of foreclosures. These short-term
amendments negate parts of mortgage contracts and question the disciplining mechanism
of finance (Roubini et al. (2009)). Moreover, the increase in volatility of house prices in
recent years (see Figure 1) exacerbated the crisis. In contrast to ad hoc approaches, we
propose a mortgage contract, the Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM), which is robust
to downturns. We demonstrate how CWMs can be offered to homeowners as an ex ante
solution to non-anticipated real estate price declines.
The Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM, Shiller (2008b)) is a two-in-one product: a
fixed rate home loan coupled with negative equity insurance. More importantly its pay-
ments are linked to home prices and adjusted downward when necessary to prevent neg-
ative equity. CWMs eliminate the expensive workout of defaulting on a plain vanilla
mortgage. This subsequently reduces the risk exposure of financial institutions and thus
the government to bailouts. CWMs share the price risk of a home with the lender and
thus provide automatic adjustments for changes in home prices. This feature eliminates
the rational incentive to exercise the costly option to default which is embedded in the
loan contract. Despite sharing the underlying risk, the lender continues to receive an un-
interrupted stream of monthly payments. Moreover, this can occur without multiple and
costly negotiations.
There had been no major decline in home prices in the U.S.A. since the Great Depression.
The subprime crisis was a rare event leading to negative equity for millions of house-
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Figure 1: US house price index (HPI) returns and volatility: decadal moving estimates.
Uses monthly data (post 1953) and interpolated monthly datapoints where finer gran-
ularity is not available (before 1953 for housing data). Each monthly estimate uses 120
monthly datapoints spanning the preceding 10 years to date. Housing data begins in
1890, interest rate data in 1871. Last observation: September 2017. Compiled data from
various sources available at: www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/
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holds all at once. Households need to proactively plan ahead to mitigate the impact of
catastrophic events with low probability as their impact on society can be devastating.
Hyman Minsky (1992) emphasizes how the fragility of the financial system culminates
in financial/banking crises. Furthermore, real estate crises are correlated with these fi-
nancial crises (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2016) and exact a huge toll on the macroeconomy
by decreasing the GDP (Renaud, 2003; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004). These losses occurred
because measures taken, such as deposit insurance, exacerbated banking crises instead of
mitigating them (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detrajiache, 2002).
Prior to the current crisis, mortgages with repayment schedules contingent on house
prices had not been considered. The academic literature, with the exception of Ambrose
and Buttimer (2012), has not discussed their mechanics and especially their design. Shiller
is the first researcher, who forcefully articulates the exigency of their employment. CWMs
were conceived in1 (Shiller (2008b) and Shiller (2009)) as an extension of the well-known
Price-Level Adjusted Mortgages (PLAMs), where the mortgage contract adjusts to a nar-
row index of local home prices instead of a broad index of consumer prices. In their recent
study, Ambrose and Buttimer (2012) numerically investigate the properties of Adjustable
Balance Mortgages which bear many similarities to CWMs. Alternatively, Duarte and
McManus (2011) suggest creation of derivative instruments written on credit losses of a
reference mortgage pool. The model in Shiller et al. (2013) complements the more intricate
one of Ambrose and Buttimer (2012). Unlike a numerical grid, it relies on a methodology
which allows valuation of optional continuous flows in closed form (see e.g. Carr et al.
(2000) and Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007)).
This paper proposes a solution that makes the housing finance system more robust to
shocks through the employment of CWMs. The cost of the insurance stemming from the
embedded put option in the CWM is quite low. This is due to economies of scale enjoyed
by the lender through: (i) hedging by geographic diversification or resorting to futures
contracts; and (ii) proactively underwriting CWMs by making the standards more strin-
gent instead of lowering them after a huge run-up in home prices. The second technique
is endorsed in Minsky (1992) and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011). If financial insti-
tutions are able to save the cost of insurance for rare calamities over several real estate
cycles, i.e. invest in a fund not correlated with real estate to support higher capital re-
serves, it will prevent them from being dependent on taxpayers and government to bail
1See also Shiller Shiller (2003) for home equity insurance.
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them out in crisis (as with deposit insurance).
Continuous workout mortgages need markets and indicators for home prices.2 These
markets and instruments already exist for lenders to hedge risks. The Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) for example, offers options and futures on single-family home prices.
Furthermore, reduction of moral hazard incentives requires inclusion of the home-price
index of the neighborhood into a repayment formula. This is to prevent moral hazard
stemming from an individual failing to maintain or, worse, damaging the property in
order to reduce mortgage payments.
Finally, we observe evidence showing the change in retirement trends (see Shiller (2014)).
More people are planning to sell their house to consume the proceeds in retirement. No-
tably, the continuing care retirement community (CCRC) is a concept that is growing
rapidly around the world. However, as a result of the drop in home prices there is a
CCRC crisis in the US today and they have a lot of vacancies. If CWMs had existed, they
could have helped to insure house values, thus preserve the welfare gain, and immunize
retirement consumption from downside variations in the house price index.
In our approach, the homeowner can choose from a classic 30-year Fixed Rate Mortgage
(FRM) or an CWM. We show that, for many households, Continuous Workout Mortgages
could be a better form of home financing instrument than FRMs.
The next section describes the contracts: the standard Fixed Rate Mortgage and the Con-
tinuous Workout contract. In Section 3 we extend our closed form approach to include
prepayments and defaults. In Section 4 we compute the equilibrium contract rates, the
embedded options to default and we assess the impact of prepayment risk. Section 5
describes data and deals with calibration of house price index paths. In Section 6 we
then conduct our simulations to numerically compare the expected utilities of Continu-
ous Workout and Fixed Rate contracts. Section 7 concludes. Longer mathematical proofs
and the floor flow option formula are collected in Appendices A and B, respectively.
2In a more general case not considered here CWMs could be made dependent on the levels of individual
incomes and, to limit moral hazard, would also need indicators and “macro markets” for specific classes of
incomes. See Shiller (1993).
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2 The contracts
2.1 The standard Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM)
A major invention introduced during years of Great Depression were fully amortizing re-
payment mortgages. Typically, these mortgages are analysed in a T = 30 year time hori-
zon. For our purposes we use a continuous time representation. In place of the monthly
payment we introduce a repayment flow rate RFRM which is constant in time. Because in-
terest rates have low volatility and are at their historical lows (see Figure 1), we motivate
prepayments as unpredictable stochastic shocks. Consequently, rates for all maturities
are constant and equal to r (see section 3 where we extend our setup to include prepay-
ment and default risks). To achieve full repayment, the mortgage balance Q decreases
and becomes zero at maturity. The mortgage balance is equal to the amount owed to the
lender at time t and can be computed as the present value of remaining payments
Q
(
RFRM, t
)
=
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)RFRM ds = R
FRM
r
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
. (1)
Differentiating (1) with respect to t we obtain the dynamics of Q
dQ
dt
= −RFRMe−r(T−t) = −RFRM
(
1− rQ
RFRM
)
= rQ− RFRM . (2)
It is deterministic and is described by the ordinary differential equation (2) with terminal
condition Q
(
RFRM, T
)
= 0. It says that the balance Q grows at rate r but is progressively
repaid by a constant mortgage payment flow RFRM. The mortgage can be repaid in full
only if the time derivative in (2) is negative, meaning the balance decreases. That is, when
the interest accumulation inflow to principal, rQ, is lower than the coupon outflow RFRM.
In other words the net flow is negative: rQ − RFRM < 0 i.e. funds are transferred back
to the lender and the mortgage is being repaid. The advantage and simplicity of FRM is
that the required repayment flow parameter RFRM can be computed and set once and for
all at the beginning, when the loan contract is signed. To compute RFRM we only need to
know three numbers: the initial balance Q0 (the loan amount), the maturity T of the loan
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and the discount rate r. The initial equilibrium condition Q0 = Q
(
RFRM, 0
)
gives
RFRM =
Q0
A (r, T)
, (3)
where A (r, T) is the annuity
A (r, T) =
∫ T
0
e−rtdt = 1− e
−rT
r
, (4)
i.e. the present value at rate r of a unit flow terminating after T years.
The simplicity of the FRM becomes problematic when a house develops negative equity.
This was the case of many households in the US in years following the burst of the hous-
ing bubble in 2007. This is illustrated on Figure 2. A $ 500 000 property is financed for 30
years and interest rates are 5%. However, a sharp price decline puts the house in negative
equity. House values are well below the line representing the balance. In this example,
although the balance in an FRM is set to be fully repaid at maturity, the house is underwa-
ter until year 11. In this example the return on original house price is then again negative
around year 20 and then year 28, because the value of the property is again below the
initial purchase price H0. However, as most of the initial balance have been repaid, the
house is not in negative equity by that time.
2.2 The repayment Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM)
In this section we argue that a standard repayment FRM can be improved by reducing
repayments in bad times. This is illustrated on Figure 3. In this example the household
benefits from a substantial reduction, proportional to the drop in the house price, up until
year 11 and then again repayments are marginally reduced in years 20 and 28.
For our framework we need a house price index ξt which is available for all t ∈ [0, T]
and, without loss of generality, an index which is normalized to one initially, i.e. ξ0 = 1.
If HPIt is the absolute value at time t of a real-world house price index (such as the Case-
Shiller index in the US or the Countrywide or Halifax index in the UK), we can define ξt
6
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Figure 2: Financing a $500000 property for 30 years with a Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM)
when interest rates are 5%. The drop in home prices puts the house in negative equity.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
T ime years
M
on
th
ly
pa
ym
en
t
CWM
FRM
Figure 3: A scenario where the insurance cost of a CWM is less than its benefit: monthly
payments are reduced in bad times.
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as
ξt =
HPIt
HPI0
=⇒ Ht = H0ξt. (5)
That is, for a house initially worth H0, the quantity H0ξt is a proxy for the value of the
house at time t > 0.
In good times, when house prices are high, the CWM behaves identically to an FRM.
Annual repayments proceed at the maximal annual rate equal to R¯CWM.3 In bad times,
the repayment flow RCWM (ξt) of a Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM) depends on
the house price index and becomes lower than R¯CWM. It decreases when the house price
index ξt decreases
RCWM (ξt) = R¯CWM min {1, ξt} = R¯CWM
[
1− (1− ξt)+
]
. (6)
Akin to the constant annual repayment rate RFRM of an FRM, the maximal annual repay-
ment rate R¯CWM of a CWM is an endogenous parameter (see Figure 4), which must be
specified upon origination of the mortgage contract.
When ξt < 1 the return on initial housing purchase is negative and the mortgage risks
negative equity if the decline in value is higher than funds repaid so far. In the highly un-
likely but not impossible, limiting scenario, when the house price index drops very close
to zero ξt → 0, the CWM contract automatically produces a full workout i.e. RCWM (ξt)→
0. That is, the lender absorbs all losses for as long as ξt remains close to this lower bound.
This can be inferred from the shape of the payoff function illustrated on Figure 4. If the
collateral becomes worthless, the homeowner should be fully compensated and shouldn’t
pay any interest or repay any principal. In other words there is full insurance against
house price declines. In more realistic, intermediate situations when the price declines
but not by too much, this contract still provides automatic compensation to homeowners.
Repayments of principal and the interest are reduced proportionally to the index. As a
consequence it is no longer possible to express the current balance as a function of future
payments. In fact, for CWMs, (1) no longer holds. Two quantities emerge which will
almost surely deviate when t > 0:
3In our notation we use a ‘bar’ over the letter R to remind us that RCWM (ξ) cannot become greater than
R¯CWM, which caps the annual repayment rate, so as to always have RCWM (ξ) ≤ R¯CWM.
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1. The actual (random) balance to date, which is equal to the present value of the initial
balance minus payments done so far
QCWM−t = Q0e
rt −
∫ t
0
RCWM (ξs) er(t−s)ds ; (7)
2. The expected payments to occur in future
QCWM+t = Et
[∫ T
t
RCWM (ξs) e−r(s−t)ds
]
. (8)
The balance QCWM−t is a path-dependent quantity because it is based on past values of
the house price index. It can go up as well as down, reflecting the history {ξs}ts=0 of the
house values observed up to time t. If we know this history we can compute the balance
as
QCWM−t =
[
Q0 − R¯CWM A (r, t)
]
ert + R¯CWM
∫ t
0
(1− ξs)+ er(t−s)ds . (9)
In particular we note that[
Q0 − R¯CWM A (r, t)
]
ert ≤ QCWM−t ≤ Q0ert , (10)
so for R¯CWM > RFRM the lower bound can become negative when t → T (see Appendix
A.1). This occurs when home prices remained high, the workout did not kick in, the
loan fraction of the package was repaid earlier and the mortgagee collected the insurance
premium over the lifetime of the contract. However, following a sharp decline in house
prices the balance can exponentially increase, as shown by the upper bound. Because
payments must stop at maturity, the lender bears risk which he was paid to hold. The
borrower has been paying a premium to compensate for this shortfall risk.
Repayments under the CWM contract vary randomly with house prices. The expected
payments quantity QCWM+t should therefore be used for valuation purposes as they re-
flect the reality a borrower is facing at a given point in time. It also has the advantage
of being forward looking, and thus not path-dependent. However, for computations, we
need to assume some distribution of the future value of the index ξs : s > t. Historically,
house prices in the mortgage pricing literature had been assumed to be log-normally dis-
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tributed (see e.g. Kau et al. (1985), Kau et al. (1992), Azevedo-Pereira et al. (2003), Sharp
et al. (2008), Ambrose and Buttimer (2012)) and here we subscribe to this trend.
At origination t = 0, we require that the initial balance and the expected payments are
equal
QCWM−0 = Q
CWM+
0 = Q0 . (11)
This equilibrium condition is necessary to compute the endogenous repayment flow R¯CWM
of a CWM. Subsequently, the fair value of the insurance premia, such as R¯CWM− RFRM em-
bedded in a CWM, can also be obtained as well as the CWM and FRM equilibrium contract
rates (see Section 4).
Proposition 1 The expected present value of future payments of the Continuous Workout Mort-
gage (CWM) at time t ∈ [0, T] is equal to
QCWM+t = R¯
CWM [A (r, T − t)− P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ)] . (12)
where P ≥ 0 is the floor (i.e. collection of put options for all maturities from t = 0 to t = T) on
continuous flow ξt capped at 1, expressed in closed form (see Appendix B), and δ, σ are the service
flow and the volatility of the house price.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The payment flow R¯CWM which appears in (12) is a constant parameter which is com-
puted at origination (t = 0) for the duration of the contract. It should not be confused
with the mortgage payment RCWM (ξt) given by equation (6) which is a function of ran-
domly changing adjusted house price level ξt. Mortgage payments RCWM (ξt) decrease
when home prices decline, whilst R¯CWM is fixed ex ante.
Proposition 2 The repayment flow of a CWM is capped by R¯CWM, which is an endogenous
parameter and can be computed explicitly as
R¯CWM =
Q0
A (r, T)− P (1, 1, T, r, δ, σ) > R
FRM . (13)
Proof. Set t = 0 in (12) and solve for R¯CWM. Inequality obtains because P (1, 1, T, r, δ, σ) >
0 i.e. a sum of put options has strictly positive value for T > 0.
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The endogenous parameter R¯CWM provides the cap on repayment flow under CWM.
Clearly, if the mortgage is fairly priced, parameter R¯CWM must be greater than RFRM
because the issuer of the insurance must be rewarded. We can think of the difference
R¯CWM − RFRM > 0 as equal to the price of the insurance to be paid in good states of na-
ture for the continuous workouts to be automatically provided should bad states occur.
If there were no risk to be compensated for (σ → 0), the present value of insurance puts
represented by the floor function P would become zero and R¯CWM would equal RFRM.
This is illustrated on Figure 5, where we also consider the case of a partial guarantee
which only covers α = 12 of the loss. Equation (13) is paramount for potential originators
of continuous workouts with repayment features. This pricing condition helps in eval-
uating the maximal annual payment for this mortgage. A broker can instantly compute
this quantity on a computer screen and make an offer to a customer. Finally, a current
estimate could be used and a regulator could mandate an upper bound on volatility σ.
Furthermore, for an “in-progress” CWM mortgage (at time t > 0), it is interesting to
analyse whether its expected present value of future payments is lower or higher than
the balance QFRMt of an otherwise identical, standard 30-year FRM. Using (1) and (4) the
latter can be written as
QFRMt = Q
(
RFRM, t
)
= Q0
A(r, T − t)
A(r, T)
. (14)
Similarly, using (12) and (13) we can represent the expected payments of a CWM as
QCWM+t = Q0
A(r, T − t)− P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ)
A(r, T)− P (1, 1, T, r, δ, σ) . (15)
Clearly, when house prices are low ξt < 1 and t is relatively low we must have QCWM+t ≤
QFRMt . This is because the insurance pays off. However, when house prices are high
ξt > 1 and closer to maturity t → T, we should expect a reversal QCWM+t ≥ QFRMt . In
this case the insurance puts expire out of the money but a CWM homeowner still has to
pay the insurance premia, which results in a slightly higher remaining balance. However,
even for very high values of the home price index, expected payments QCWM+t are always
capped from above by
Q¯CWMt = Q0
A(r, T − t)
A(r, T)− P (1, 1, T, r, δ, σ) ≥ Q
CWM+
t , (16)
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Figure 4: Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM): The repayment flow RCWM (ξt) as a
function of the house price index ξt.
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Figure 5: Maximal CWM payment R¯CWM as a function of risk σ. Full workout (CWM,
α = 1, thick line), reduced workout (CWM, α = 12 ,dashed line), no workout (FRM, α = 0,
thin line). Riskless rate r = 10%, maturity T = 30 years, service flow rate δ = 4%. Note:
The annual payments R are above r = 10% because both FRM and CWM mortgages are
of repayment type i.e. R is composed of annual interest and annual repayment.
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which has been computed as limξ→∞ QCWM+t . Note that Q¯CWMt and QFRMt are similarly
shaped, concave functions of time t, both decreasing to zero at maturity T. However,
Q¯CWMt always dominates Q
FRM
t . The difference Q¯
CWM
t − QFRMt > 0 is relatively small
and represents a “cushion” area above the standard repayment schedule QFRMt . It is in
this area where the insurance premium is collected in good times.
Figures 6 and 7 summarize the key differences between FRM and CWM. For FRMs, there
is a fixed repayment schedule. In contrast, the repayment schedule for a CWM has a
fixed upper bound. This upper bound is above (but very close to) the FRM’s schedule,
forming a “cushion” (see Figure 6). The area immediately below the upper bound Q¯CWMt
(the “cushion”) will get quickly “populated” by QCWM+t in good times. With reference
to FRMs we could therefore say that this extra cushion needs to be there for CWMs to
collect the insurance premia in good times. However, in bad times, the CWM’s payments
outstanding can dive well below FRM’s outstanding balance (which is fixed for a given
time t). This self adjustment mechanism is key to remain away from negative equity,
avoid the house becoming underwater and prevent foreclosures automatically (see Figure
7).
We also investigate the behaviour of a CWM under alternative path scenarios. In the first
scenario (Figure 8) prices drop and stay at 40% of initial value until maturity. In the sec-
ond scenario (Figure 9) prices also drop to 40% of initial value but then jump and stay
at $600000 which represents 110% of the initial value. In both cases expected payments
evolve similarly, progressively decreasing to zero at maturity. Obviously, the starting
point for the second scenario is much higher than for the first. However, this starting
point must always lie below the upper bound Q¯CWMt , no matter how much prices appre-
ciate in future.
3 Prepayments and Defaults
Because our approach is analytic, it is relatively straightforward to extend it to include
prepayments and defaults.
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Figure 6: The CWM’s upper bound on expected future payments v.s. FRM’s scheduled
remaining balance.
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Figure 7: Expected future payments of a CWM, QCWM+t , as a function of the current house
price levels measured by a Home Price index ξt and Initial Price H0. The dashed line is
the CWM upper bound Q¯CWMt .
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Figure 8: The expected future payments of a CWM when house prices decrease to 40% of
initial value and then remain at this level until term.
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Figure 9: The expected future payments of a CWM when house prices first decrease to
40% of initial value, then instantly appreciate to 110% of initial value and remain at this
level until term.
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3.1 Prepayments
In the traditional approach to pricing prepayments non-constant interest rates and their
effect on prepayment is examined. In particular, the rational early exercise of the Ameri-
can-style prepayment option embedded in a mortgage contract. Modelling these require
sophisticated techniques for numerically solving an options pricing problem. In a well-
known study Fama (1990) highlights the influence of monetary policy on the behavior
of interest rates and thus term structure. It follows that, in the current economic envi-
ronment, the prevailing view is that the yield curve will continue to flatten and that the
Federal Reserve Board will not raise interest rates drastically. This is elaborated, for ex-
ample, in the following recent articles:
“As for skyrocketing long rates, that seems unlikely during the current economic
cycle. [...] Since inflation is tamed when real rates rise enough to choke off economic
expansion, the lower is the nominal rate necessary to restrain it.”
“Rates are unlikely to skyrocket, despite pundits predictions”
Scott Minerd, FT, July 18, 2017, p. 28
“Another month, another impressively low unemployment number, but another
flaccid inflation print. No wonder the US Federal Reserve is baffled. Modern macroe-
conomic theory depends upon the famous Phillips curve, and its pressure cooker model
of the inflationary process. Let the economy run too hot, and inflation is sure to follow.
Let the pressure drop too low, and wage and price growth will ease. Yet in the US,
unemployment is at multiyear lows but inflation is nowhere in sight. In the UK it is
hardly better. In Japan it is even worse. Across the developed economies, the Phillips
curve has gone ignominiously flat. The world’s central bankers are scratching their
heads.”
“Lessons from inflation theorists of the past”
Felix Martin, FT, July 28, 2017, p. 11
On top of rational prepayments becoming less likely, modelling early exercise of the
American-style prepayment option is incomplete because it does not reflect prepayments
and selling off houses early which are unrelated to interest rate changes; or the other side
of prepayments, which is staying in the house longer than usual so as not to lose the mort-
gage. In what follows we therefore show how our approach can be adapted to introduce
prepayments modelled as a one-off occurrence of a random event.
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3.1.1 FRM
Let τ be the random refinancing time and 1t<τ the indicator function equal to 1 if pre-
payment did not occur at time t and 0 otherwise. Conditional on prepayment not having
occurred before time t ≥ 0, the balance of a fully amortizing FRM mortgage should satisfy
QˆFRMt = E

∫ T
t
1{ s<τ|t<τ}e−r(s−t)RFRM ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
payments until τ>t
+ (1+ φ) 1t<τ≤Te−r(τ−t)QFRMτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
prepayment at τ>t
 , (17)
where φ is the percentage prepayment penalty and the expectation E is to be taken under
the risk-neutral measure. Cash flows are risky, because of the prepayment risk. The
outstanding balance at time τ > t is given by
QFRMτ =
RFRM
r
(
1− e−r(T−τ)
)
. (18)
Working out expectations with respect to the random prepayment time τ we obtain
QˆFRMt =
∫ T
t
F (s) e−r(s−t)RFRM ds + (1+ φ)
∫ T
t
h (s) e−r(s−t)QFRMs ds , (19)
where
F (s) = E
[
1{ s<τ|t<τ}
]
= Pr ( s < τ| t < τ) = e−λ(s−t) (20)
is the cumulative probability of the loan surviving beyond time s, conditional on the loan
being alive at time t : s > t and λ is the Poisson intensity of the prepayment event.
Similarly, the term h (s) is the conditional probability density of the loan being prepaid
within time interval (s, s + ds] i.e.
h (s) =
d
ds
(1− F (s)) = λe−λ(s−t) . (21)
It follows that
QˆFRMt =
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(s−t)RFRMds+(1+ φ)
∫ T
t
λe−(r+λ)(s−t) R
FRM
r
(
1− e−r(T−s)
)
ds , (22)
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which gives the following intermediate condition valid for t ∈ [0, T] provided that pre-
payment did not occur
QˆFRMt = R
FRMx (t) = Q0
x (t)
x (0)
(23)
where
x (t) = A (r, T − t) + φ [A (r, T − t)− A (r + λ, T − t)] (24)
For t = 0 we have QˆFRM0 = Q0, which gives the initial equilibrium condition. This
condition can be solved to reveal the fair repayment rate of an FRM, which takes into
account subsequent prepayment risk and associated costs
RFRM =
Q0
x0
. (25)
where x0 = x (0). We can check that in absence of prepayment risk (λ = 0) or pre-
payment costs (φ = 0) the above formula reverts to (3) which was computed under no
prepayments. We conclude that, from lender’s perspective, a repayment FRM is robust
to random prepayments, as long as upon the prepayment event the borrower repays the
full amount due, given by (18). The CWM which we study in the next subsection should
behave in a similar fashion.
3.1.2 CWM
The annual payment of the CWM depends on the house price level. As a result the house
price risk and the prepayment risk will interact. In what follows we incorporate the pre-
payment risk into the equilibrium pricing equation of the CWM. In practice, a mortgage
contract is negotiated so that no prepayment should occur immediately. However, the
equilibrium value and the ensuing equilibrium contract rate have to incorporate the fact
that prepayment can potentially occur at any time. We proceed with the equilibrium con-
dition that the expected future payments (8), with prepayment risk included, must be
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equal to the loan balance at time t > 0
QˆCWMt = E

∫ T
t
1{ s<τ|t<τ}e−r(s−t)RCWM (ξs) ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
payments until τ>t
+ (1+ φ) 1t<τ≤Te−r(τ−t)QCWMτ (ξτ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prepayment at τ

(26)
Here, cash flows are risky, because of the prepayment risk and the house price risk embed-
ded in the house price index ξ. Upon a prepayment event the lender will compute and
inform the borrower about the repayment amount, QCWMτ (ξτ), akin to outstanding balance
of an FRM, to be repaid. A prepayment penalty is easily added by multiplying the second
term by 1 + φ, where again φ is the percentage penalty. Computed in a fair manner, the
balance at time τ should take into account the current value of the house price index ξτ so
that to reflect the present value of the expected future promised payments of the CWM.
That means, unlike for FRMs where annual repayments are insensitive to ξ; e.g. if ξτ is
low upon prepayment, the balance to be repaid should be lowered. We already obtained
an explicit formula for a fair QCWMτ (ξτ) which should be equal to QCWM+τ (ξτ) given in
equations (12) and (15).
Alternatively, the contract could stipulate the remaining balance as based on the maximal
required annual CWM repayment R¯CWM. This would be similar to an FRM (for which the
prepaid amount is based on RFRM), and could be computed using equation (18) where
RFRM should be replaced by R¯CWM. In any case, the customer should not be required to
pay more than R¯CWM/r (1− exp {−r (T − t)}) plus any prepayment penalty.
Working out expectations with respect to the random prepayment time τ gives
QˆCWMt =
∫ T
t
F (s) e−r(s−t)E
[
RCWM (ξs)
]
ds+(1+ φ)
∫ T
t
h (s) e−r(s−t)E
[
QCWMs (ξs)
]
ds ,
(27)
where the expectation E is to be taken along the house price risk dimension represented
by ξ. The first time integral represents the expected present value of continuous annual
CWM payments RCWM (ξ) received until prepayment date τ or maturity T, whichever
comes first. The second time integral represents the expected present value of the lump
sum prepayment received before maturity. The lump sum is assumed equal to estimated
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value of the principal outstanding. Using (20), (21) and (27) we obtain
QˆCWMt = R¯
CWM
∫ T
t
e−(λ+r)(s−t)E
[
1− (1− ξs)+
]
ds (28)
+ R¯CWM (1+ φ)
∫ T
t
λe−(λ+r)(s−t)E [[A (r, T − s)− P (ξs, 1, T − s, r, δ, σ)]] ds.
It is straightforward to compute the first integral, which contains a weighted floor i.e. a
weighted time integral of put options. That is λ adds to the rates r and δ
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(s−t)E
[
(1− ξs)+
]
ds = (29)
=
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(s−t)×
× E
[(
1− ξt exp
{(
(r + λ)− (δ+ λ)− σ
2
2
)
(s− t) + σ (Zs − Zt)
})+]
ds
= P (ξt, 1, T − t, r + λ, δ+ λ, σ) .
This is effectively a weighted sum of floorlets on the normalized house price index ξ
struck at 1 over a continuum of maturities s ∈ [t, T]. Each floorlet is weighted by the
probability e−λ(s−t) that the loan will not be prepaid before s > t. By design of the
contract, in-the-money floorlets (insurance puts) are automatically exercised to lower the
annual payment, unless a prepayment happens. Annual payments continue “along” at
the rate R¯CWM until a prepayment happens or maturity is reached. That is, their expected
present value must also be adjusted by the prepayment intensity parameter λ so that
R¯CWM
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(s−t)ds = R¯CWM A (r + λ, T − t) . (30)
Integrating the annuity in the second integral is also straightforward
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(s−t)A (r, T − s) ds = A (r, T − t)− A (λ, T − t) e
−r(T−t)
r + λ
. (31)
However, the last element of computation involves an integral of time-t expected values
of the floor function P, prepayment-adjusted within interval s ∈ [t, T]. This is in fact a
double time integral and a change of integration order gives a closed form (see Appendix
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A.3)
∫ T
t
λe−(r+λ)(s−t)E [P (ξs, 1, T − s, r, δ, σ)] ds (32)
= P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ)− P (ξt, 1, T − t, r + λ, δ+ λ, σ)
We are now ready to state the equilibrium equality that holds at time t ≥ 0, determining
the equilibrium maximal annual payment R¯CWM when prepayments occur with intensity
λ. For any t ∈ [0, T] and ξt > 0 define the adjusted annuity function
X (ξt, t) = A (r, T − t)− P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ) (33)
+ φ
[
A (r, T − t)− P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ)
− A (r + λ, T − t) + P (ξt, 1, T − t, r + λ, δ+ λ, σ)
]
Proposition 3 In presence of prepayments with intensity λ, the value of promised payments of
the CWM at time t > 0, with random prepayments included, is equal to
QˆCWM+t = R¯
CWMX (ξt, t) (34)
where X is given by (33). In equilibrium4 QˆCWM+t = Q0 and (34) can be inverted to derive an
estimate5 of the equilibrium maximal mortgage payment R¯CWM
R¯CWM ≈ Q0
X (1, 0)
(35)
Remark 4 It is easy to check that under no-prepayments regime (λ → 0), implying A (λ, T) →
T, (35) reduces to (13) from Proposition 2. Similarly, in absence of prepayment penalties (φ = 0),
(35) simplifies to (13) and (34) reduces to (15). Therefore, from lender’s perspective, the CWM
too possesses the “robustness”’ property of the FRM, provided that the prepaid amount is fairly
calculated, i.e. (34) is used.
Finally, we note that professional conventions, such as CPR (Conditional Prepayment
Rate) and PSA (Public Securities Association) prepayment model, assume that the pre-
4For inclusion of arrangement fees pi (points) and default risk and their impact on R¯CWM see Section 4.
5The estimate considered here embeds prepayment risk. See Section 4for estimates incorporating both
prepayments and default risk.
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payment rate λ is constant in time and independent of the interest rate r. In practice,
however, λ will be influenced by the level of interest rates. Following Gorovoy and Linet-
sky (2007) we suggest a rate-dependent intensity λ (r) equal to a prepayment intensity λp
plus a refinancing intensity λr
λ (r) = λp + λr = λp + l (r− r)+ . (36)
The prepayment component λp accounts for prepayments due to exogenous reasons such
as relocations. The refinancing component λr increases when the interest rate r decreases.
This effect can be calibrated using the multiplier l > 0 and the threshold r > 0 parameters.
When the interest rate r exceeds the threshold r, the refinancing component λr vanishes,
reflecting the fact that homeowners will not rationally refinance when interest rates are
high. Initially, we should have r < r, so that there is no incentive to refinance immediately
after the mortgage is originated.
3.2 Defaults
The borrower’s decision to default is more difficult to model. Modelling the endogenous
decision to default involves pricing an American put option where the underlying vari-
able is the value of the mortgaged property. The standard approach in the literature is
to solve the problem using general purpose numerical methods which can be complex to
program and time consuming.6
With notable exceptions of the singular perturbation approach of Sharp et al. (2008) and
the Viegas and Azevedo-Pereira (2012) Richardson’s extrapolation technique a` la Geske
and Johnson (1984), research for approximate closed-form solutions for mortgages incor-
porating the default option have been few. In this section we extend this strand of litera-
ture by attaching a default option to our finite-maturity closed-form pricing solution for
the CWM we obtained in sections 2.2 and 3.1.
It is well-known from the literature that valuation of American put options is an optimal
stopping, free boundary problem, for which no known exact mathematical solution al-
6For example Sharp et al. (2008) report computation times of more than 10 hours for computing just one
equilibrium contract rate by numerically solving the Partial Differential Equation (PDE) for a given set of
parameters.
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gorithm exists. Consequently, except for very particular cases, not normally encountered
in practice, e.g. perpetual mortgages with infinite maturity, there are no closed-form for-
mulas available. However, it is incorrect to assume that there is no accurate analytical
treatment of options where early exercise is permitted (Shaw, 1998, chapter 11). More im-
portantly, rushing to numerical methods forces one to abandon quick and efficient com-
putation of Greeks by ordinary differentiation. These hedge ratios are involved in the
calculation of exposures of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). Therefore, this particular
aspect is paramount for mortgages and has practical implications for issuers when they
manage existing portfolios of MBS or introduce new credit products such as CWMs.
In present context it is important to notice that unlike traded American put options, the
underlying house price can only be measured approximately. And, unlike a stock price,
it cannot be observed very frequently and the futures series should not be trended. More-
over, exogenous factors affect the real magnitude of default options embedded in mort-
gages and most of these factors are unobservable and unpredictable. For example, a sud-
den loss of income (which is borrower-specific, and thus rarely modeled in the literature)
may force a family to default even when house prices are very high. Therefore, the aim
here is to have an analytic rather than an accurate or fast valuation,7 to assess how the
house price dimension affects the decision to default. Therefore, we will approximate the
value of the option to default, D0, by a closed-form approximation.
3.2.1 CWM
We write the value to the lender of the prepayable mortgage, VCWMt , as equal to
VCWMt = Q
CWM+
t − Dt
(
QCWM+t , Ht
)
, (37)
where QCWM+t is the expected present value of outstanding payments of a CWM, exposed
to prepayments, as given by equation (34) we obtained in the previous section. The sec-
ond term on the right hand side, Dt, is the embedded American put option to default. It
is a function of the expected outstanding payments QCWM+t , too, and of Ht, the current
value of the property at time t ∈ [0, T]. Below the optimal default threshold HCWMt the
7Numerical methods can be fast and accurate but do not offer the same insight as an analytic approach.
23
payoff of the put must satisfy the following free boundary condition8
Dt
(
QCWM+t , Ht
)
= QCWM+t − Ht for all Ht ≤ HCWMt and all t (38)
In the default zone the householder saves the expected future payments net of the current
value of the house which reverts to the lender via repossession. For what follows it is
useful to express QCWM+t and Ht in terms of the house price index ξt we introduced in
Section 3.1 and introduce the corresponding optimal default threshold, ξCWM, for the
index ξ. Letting ξt → ξCWMt then implies in particular (provided that a prepayment did
not happen before t) that the optimal exercise boundary, ξCWMt , of the option to default
can be expressed as
D
(
ξCWMt , t
)
= H0
(
l
η
X
(
ξCWMt , t
)
− ξCWMt
)
for all t , (39)
where X is given by (33), l is the initial Loan To Value (LTV) ratio
l = Q0/H0 (40)
and η is a normalization parameter, independent of t
η = X (1, 0) . (41)
We have also modified notation of the function D so that to emphasize its dependence
on time t and the value of the index ξt. Condition (39) is the value-matching condition.
It gives the payoff upon early default. The value of the default option must therefore be
equal to the fraction of the initial house price, H0. The scaling factor is an American put
on the house price index ξt. Unlike for stock options, the exercise price of this American
put is not constant. It is a function of time t and the index ξt, but also depends on the
loan to value ratio l and other parameters embedded in X not shown here, such as the
prepayment intensity λ, the prepayment penalty φ, the volatility of the house price index
σ, etc. For a full list of dependencies see equation (33). From (39) it is also easy to see that
a rational exercise of the default option at origination (t → 0) would never be optimal
when l < 1, i.e. for LTV ratios below 100%, which are typically encountered in practice
8In particular, the initial value of the threshold must satisfy H0 > H0, so that no defaults occur immedi-
ately upon origination of a new mortgage to a customer.
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and never at maturity (t→ T).
The default option must also satisfy the limit condition applicable to any put on underly-
ing ξ
lim
ξt→∞
D (ξt, t) = 0 . (42)
Among all admissible solutions of the partial differential equation obeyed by D satisfy-
ing the above condition and all the corresponding early exercise boundaries ξCWM, we
should retain the solution pair
{
D, ξCWM
}
which maximizes the value of the default op-
tion to the householder. For a given t it can be shown, in a way analogous to Merton
(1973) who deals with a simpler case of constant exercise price, that this occurs when the
following first order optimality condition, obtained by differentiating (39) with respect to
ξ and letting ξt → ξCWMt , holds
∂
∂ξ
D
(
ξCWMt , t
)
= H0
(
l
η
∂
∂ξ
X
(
ξCWMt , t
)
− 1
)
(43)
Note that this smooth-pasting condition is substantially different from the standard one for
an American put with constant strike, which would just produce −H0 on the right hand
side. This is because at the point of exercise we have to smoothly paste the default option
not into a straight line but into a non-linear strike function, whose curvature depends on
time t (as for the FRM) but also (as opposed to the FRM) on the level of the house price
index ξt.
We can decompose the value of our American put D into an otherwise identical European
default put p plus an early exercise premium ε (see e.g. Carr et al. (1992)), i.e. D = p + ε.
However, for mortgages, unlike for stock options, the value of the default option is always
zero at maturity. It follows that p = 0 i.e. the value of the European default put must be
zero throughout and D = ε. The value of the put comes entirely from defaulting on
payments before the end of the mortgage i.e. repayment.9
MacMillan (1986) and Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) obtain their approximations by
9Our approach can still be used for designs where the strike price does not converge to zero at maturity,
e.g. non amortizing (‘flat’ strike not depending on time or the HPI ξ) or partly amortizing mortgages, pro-
vided that the value of the resulting European put is included in the computation, analogously to inclusion
of the European put in the Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) decomposition of the plain vanilla American
put.
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considering solutions to the early exercise premia ε (ξt, t). In numerous numerical exper-
iments they show that their algorithm is very accurate and considerably more computa-
tionally efficient than finite-difference, binomial, or compound-option pricing methods.
We adapt their multiplicative separation approach to obtain accurate approximations for
our repayment CWM mortgage. In contrast, we can impose separability directly on the
function D. We require
D (ξt, t) = f (ξt) · g (t) , (44)
where
g (t) = rA (r, T − t) = 1− e−r(T−t) . (45)
We substitute (44) into the partial differential equation (see (106), Appendix B) obeyed by
D. It follows that
1
2
σ2ξ2Dξξ + (r− δ) ξDξ + Dt = rD ,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Substituting (44) and (45) we have
1
2
σ2ξ2 f ′′ (ξ) g (t) + (r− δ) ξ f ′ (ξ) g (t) + f (ξ) g′ (t) = r f (ξ) g (t) . (46)
Observing g′ (t) = −re−r(T−t) = r (g (t)− 1), dividing by f (ξ) and g (t) and noting the
function g (t) as if it were a constant g, we obtain
1
2
σ2ξ2
f ′′ (ξ)
f (ξ)
+ (r− δ) ξ f
′ (ξ)
f (ξ)
=
r
g (t)
. (47)
This equation is not properly separated because g (t) is not a constant but a function
of time t. If g (t) were a constant, i.e. if we could write g (t) = g, the solution to the
corresponding ordinary differential equation with constant coefficients would have the
form
f (ξ) = aCWMξq , (48)
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where aCWM is a constant and q is the negative root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2q (q− 1) + (r− δ) q = r
g (t)
, (49)
so that (42) holds. However, because g is a function of time, so must be q, which gives
q (t) =
1
2
− r− δ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− r− δ
σ2
)2
+
r
g (t)
2
σ2
< 0 , (50)
where g (t) is given by (45). It follows that we can express the option to default as
D (ξ, t) = aCWMξq(t)g (t) , (51)
where q (t) is given by (50). The constant aCWM and the optimal exercise boundary ξCWMt
at time t have to be determined from the value-matching (39) and smooth-pasting (43)
system of equations a
CWMg (t)
(
ξCWMt
)q(t)
= H0
[
l
ηX
(
ξCWMt , t
)
− ξCWMt
]
aCWMg (t) q (t)
(
ξCWMt
)q(t)−1
= H0
[
l
η
∂
∂ξ X
(
ξCWMt , t
)
− 1
]
.
(52)
Dividing side-wise the second equation by the first, aCWM is eliminated and we get
1
q (t)
=
1
ξCWMt
·
l
ηX
(
ξCWMt , t
)
− ξCWMt
l
η
∂
∂ξ X
(
ξCWMt , t
)
− 1
, (53)
which can easily be solved numerically to obtain the boundary ξCWMt . In particular, both
X (ξ, t) and it’s derivative ∂∂ξ X (ξ, t) are available in closed form.
10 Once ξCWMt is calcu-
lated, aCWM can be obtained from either of the equations of the system (52). This ends
the valuation of the embedded default put option (51). We note in particular that the
final result, (51), is not multiplicatively separable in ξ and t which contradicts the initial
assumption.11 However, the method is a tour de force as it achieves the stated goal, which
10Closed form expressions for partials of the floor ∂∂ξ P (ξ, 1, T − t, r + λ, δ+ λ, σ) can be found in Shack-
leton and Wojakowski (2007). For computations, since X (ξ, t) is given in closed form (33), we used Mathe-
matica computer algebra software to calculate these partials in closed form.
11D is of the form f (ξ, t) · g (t) instead of f (ξ) · g (t) because in f the power of ξ is a function of time,
q (t).
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is to obtain accurate values of both the option and the free boundary.
Finally, we note that, the logarithm of the final result is multiplicatively separable in ξ and
t. That is, we have ln D = ϕ (ξ) · χ (t) where ϕ,χ are some functions. Note that if instead
we had the initial assumption satisfied all along, i.e. D = f (ξ) · g (t), the Barone-Adesi
and Whaley (1987) method would be an exact method for pricing American options and
not an approximation.
3.2.2 FRM
The value to the lender of a prepayable, fixed rate mortgage, VFRMt , can also be decom-
posed into
VFRMt = Qˆ
FRM
t − DFRMt
(
QˆFRMt , Ht
)
, (54)
where QˆFRMt is the expected present value of outstanding payments of an FRM, subject
to prepayments, as given by equation (23) we obtained in the previous section. Function
DFRMt , is similarly, the embedded American put to default. Below the optimal default
threshold HFRMt , which will be different from H
CWM
t , must satisfy the initial condition
HFRMt < H0 too and the free boundary condition
DFRM
(
QˆFRMt , Ht
)
= QˆFRMt − Ht for all Ht ≤ HFRMt and all t (55)
Borrower maximizes value by defaulting immediately after crossing down the boundary
HFRMt . Using (23) and (5) gives
DFRM
(
QˆFRMt , Ht
)
= Q0
x (t)
x0
− H0ξt , (56)
where x0 = x (0) and x (t) is given by (24). Using notation l = Q0/H0 for the LTV ratio
as before, rearranging, letting ξt → ξFRMt and conditional on prepayment not happen-
ing before t ≥ 0, the default option can be written as a function of the optimal exercise
boundary, ξFRMt
DFRM
(
ξFRMt , t
)
= H0
(
l
x0
x (t)− ξFRMt
)
for all t . (57)
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Condition (57) is the value-matching condition for an FRM and gives the payoff upon early
default, a fraction of the initial house price, H0. The exercise price of the scaling American
put on the house price index ξt is here a function of time t, loan to value ratio l and early
prepayment parameters (intensity λ and penalty φ) but is not a function of the index ξt
or its volatility σ.12 This is why the smooth-pasting condition for FRM here is analogue to
a standard American put, where the strike does not depend on the underlying asset, and
simplifies to
∂
∂ξt
DFRM
(
ξFRMt , t
)
= −H0 (58)
We decompose DFRM into a European put plus an early default premium: DFRM =
pFRM + εFRM and notice that pFRM = 0. At maturity the loan is fully amortized and
default is impossible, implying DFRM = εFRM. We then follow the Barone-Adesi and
Whaley (1987) and MacMillan (1986) as we did for the CWM. We impose separability
DFRM (ξt, t) = f FRM (ξt) · g (t) , (59)
where g (t) is given by (45), the same as for the CWM. We substitute (59) into the partial
differential equation (see again (106), Appendix B) obeyed by DFRM to discover that it
follows that same Partial Differential Equation as DCWMand must have the same form of
the power solution
DFRM (ξ, t) = aFRMξq(t)g (t) (60)
where q (t) is the same, negative solution of the fundamental quadratic, given by (50)
and aFRM is a constant proper to an FRM which must be calculated from the system of
two equations derived from the value-matching (57) and smooth-pasting (58) boundary
conditions
(
ξFRMt
)q(t)
aFRMg (t) = H0
(
l
x0
x (t)− ξFRMt
)
aFRMq (t)
(
ξFRMt
)q(t)−1
g (t) = −H0 .
(61)
12Here too a rational default at origination (t → 0) or maturity (t → T) would never be optimal for LTV
ratios below 100% (l < 1). Similarly limξt→∞ DCWM (ξt, t) = 0.
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Eliminating aFRM we get
ξFRMt =
l x(t)x0
1− 1q(t)
Interestingly this reveals that the (approximate) boundary ξFRMt can be obtained in closed
form and so can the default option “scale,” the constant aFRM
aFRM = − H0
g (t) q (t)
(
ξFRMt
)1−q(t)
= − H0
g (t) q (t)
 l x(t)x0
1− 1q(t)
1−q(t) (62)
which gives the default option for FRM in closed form
DFRM (ξ, t) = − H0
q (t)
 l x(t)x0
1− 1q(t)
1−q(t) ξq(t) (63)
Finally note that although not explicit in our notation, x (t) and x0 do depend on prepay-
ment frequency and penalty parameters λ, φ (see equation (24)).
4 Equilibrium contract rate for the CWM and the FRM when
default and prepayment risks are present
The point of our paper is that the FRM and the CWM have different risks embedded in
them. The FRM places house price risk entirely on the borrower until the point where
they would default. The CWM mitigates this risk and, depending on design of how the
repayment schedule responds to changes in house prices, transfers all or considerable
portions of the house price risk to the lender. The lender is paid a risk premium, in the
form of increased repayment rates of the CWM in good states, to bear this risk.
As a result these two contracts will not have the same payment rate in equilibrium. Con-
sequently, their contract rates will differ too. In this section we show how to calculate the
correct contract rate of a CWM and how to compare it to the contract rate of an FRM. In
order to correctly price the CWM, in the previous section we embedded the prepayment
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and the default risk premia in the value of a CWM to the lender (see equation (37)). Using
Black Scholes options pricing framework these premia can be computed as expectations
under the martingale measure of the expected future CWM and FRM payoffs, discounted
using the riskless rate r. As a result, both CWM and FRM are correctly priced, even
though pricing by arbitrage requires discounting using the same rate.
We initially expressed our equilibrium result in the language of equilibrium annual payments,
RFRM and R¯CWM (and to be more precise: equilibrium annual maximal payment R¯CWM,
in the case of the CWM). We will now establish a link between these quantities and the
equilibrium contract rates for the CWM and the FRM.
4.1 FRM
For a mortgage with initial balance Q0 the monthly compounded ‘contract rate’ r¯c is typi-
cally defined via the equation linking the maturity N (expressed as the number of months
remaining) and the monthly payment MP
Q0 =
MP
r¯c
12
(
1− 1(
1+ r¯c12
)N
)
(64)
It is expressed in percentages per annum and is discretely compounded. Clearly, if all the
monthly payments MP are riskless, the right hand side is the present value of a monthly
paid annuity and r¯c must be equal to the riskless rate. This definition is still used in pricing
situations where spot riskless rates are stochastic and monthly payments are implicitly
stochastic i.e. where the monthly payment MP can randomly discontinue before maturity
due to prepayment or default, see e.g. Kau et al. (1992). In these papers, for a given initial
balance Q0, term N and a candidate solution contract rate rc the corresponding monthly
‘promised’ payment MP is computed via equation (64). It is then checked by solving the
pricing PDE numerically (Feynman-Kac), whether the present value (discounted at the
riskless rate r) of risk-neutral expectations of the series of monthly payments MP is equal
to Q0. If it is, that means the rate r¯c is the equilibrium contract rate.
In this section we show that in absence of default and prepayment risks the equilibrium
contract rate of a CWM must be greater than the equilibrium contract rate of an FRM. This
is because CWM contract incorporates house price risk. For the FRM we use a continuous-
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time expression, analogous to (64)
Q0 =
RFRM
rFRMc
(
1− exp
{
−rFRMc T
})
(65)
where rFRMc is the equilibrium, continuously compounded FRM contract rate, expressed
in percentages per annum. This means that knowing the equilibrium annual repayment
rate RFRM, we can figure out the corresponding equilibrium FRM contract rate rFRMc . When
all FRM cash flows are riskless, we must have rFRMc = r, where r is the riskless rate.
To avoid the contractual arbitrage, the equilibrium condition which must be satisfied at
origination is
Q0 (1− pi) = VFRM0 = QˆFRM0 − DFRM (1, 0) (66)
That is, the value Q0 of the home loan granted by the lender minus any arrangement fees
pi (points) expressed as a percentage of the loan, should be equal to the value of the mort-
gage to the lender, i.e. the value of promised payments, considering the possibility of
prepayment, minus the option to default. This gives13
H0l (1− pi) = RFRMx0 + H0q0
(
l
1− 1q0
)1−q0
(67)
which we can solve for the (promised) annual repayment rate RFRM
RFRM =
H0
x0
l (1− pi)− 1
q0
(
l
1− 1q0
)1−q0 (68)
and obtain the continuously compounded equilibrium contract rate rFRMc by inverting
(65). It turns out that this, again, can be obtained in closed from
rFRMc =
1
T
[
RFRMT
Q0
+W
(
−R
FRMT
Q0
exp
{
−R
FRMT
Q0
})]
, (69)
where W is the Lambert-W function, also known as product log. Because rFRMc is a continu-
13Note that q (0) = q0 < 0.
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r¯FRMc [%]
T = 15 20 25 30
σ = 5%
Intensity + BAW 10.124 10.112 10.105 6.026
PDE 10.146 10.124 10.146
Binomial 5.134
σ = 10%
Intensity + BAW 10.597 10.523 10.478 6.224
PDE 10.028 10.082 10.113
Binomial 6.22
Table 1: A quick comparison of equilibrium contract rates. Intensity + BAW: this work;
PDE: Crank-Nicolson PSOR approach of Sharp et al. (2008) r = r0 = 10%, δ = 7.5%;
Binomial: twin-tree approach of Ambrose and Buttimer (2012) r = 6%, r0 = 4%, δ = 2%.
ously compounded rate, it can be converted to monthly rate via
r¯FRMc = 12
(
exp
{
1
12
rFRMc
}
− 1
)
. (70)
We start by checking the output of our model against figures obtained using other meth-
ods. From Table 1 it emerges that, when house price volatility is small, our approximate
contract rates tend to slightly undervalue the allegedly very high accurate PDE solutions
obtained via Crank and Nicolson (1947) implicit PSOR scheme approach of Sharp et al.
(2008). When volatility is high the opposite happens. Our estimates also slightly over-
value the Binomial approach of Ambrose and Buttimer (2012), but are very close for
σ = 10%. However this is less surprising as their term structure is steep (spot rate r
starts at 4% and converges to 6% in long term) while the term structure of Sharp et al.
(2008) is flat (spot rate r starts at 10% and remains in the vicinity of 10% in the long term).
Consistently with the options pricing theory, the higher the volatility of the house price,
the higher the equilibrium contract rates obtained from our model. Also consistently with
common wisdom (and unlike the PDE results of Sharp et al. (2008) which exhibit a local
minimum at T = 20 years), the longer the term of the mortgage contract, the lower our
model’s equilibrium mortgage rates.14
14Sharp et al. (2008) work from European perspective with maturities typically up to T = 25 years in
the UK while Ambrose and Buttimer (2012) work with the standard T = 30 year maturity US mortgage.
We only report contract values for lowest volatilities of interest rate they consider i.e. for σr = 5%. This is
empirically motivated by our observations made in Section 1.
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4.2 CWM
In contrast, because cash flows of the CWM are explicitly stochastic, defining the corre-
sponding ‘contract rate’ is not straightforward. However, by analogy with (64) and (65)
we posit
Q0 =
R¯CWM
rCWMc
(
1− exp
{
−rCWMc T
})
(71)
where R¯CWM is the equilibrium annual repayment rate of the CWM (which we obtained
in closed form) and rCWMc is the corresponding equilibrium CWM contract rate. Because
CWM cash flows are all stochastic and capped by R¯CWM, which is the equilibrium maximal
annual repayment rate, rCWMc is in fact the equilibrium CWM maximal contract rate. To
obtain R¯CWM we start with the same initial equilibrium condition as we were using for
FRM
Q0 (1− pi) = VCWM0 = QˆCWM0 − DCWM (1, 0) (72)
where VCWM0 is the value to the lender and pi are the points. The major difference is the
DCWM (1, 0) component which is in closed form too but requires one of the arguments
(the early default boundary ξCWM
0
) to be solved for numerically. Using (34) we obtain
R¯CWM =
Q0 (1− pi) + DCWM (1, 0)
X (1, 0)
(73)
which in conjunction with (71) should be used to obtain the CWM contract rate rCWMc .
Monthly compounded CWM contract rate is obtained from rCWMc using
r¯CWMc = 12
(
exp
{
1
12
rCWMc
}
− 1
)
. (74)
4.3 CWM v.s. FRM contract rates
It is interesting to compare CWM to FRM annual payments R¯CWM, RFRM and the associ-
ated contract rates r¯CWMc , rFRMc . In absence of prepayments (λ = 0 or φ = 0) we obtain
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RFRM =
Q0 (1− pi) + DFRM (1, 0)
A (r, T)
v.s. R¯CWM =
Q0 (1− pi) + DCWM (1, 0)
A (r, T)− P (1, 1, T, r, δ, σ) (75)
There are two opposite effects which determine the CWM maximal annual payment
R¯CWM. On one hand CWM commands a positive insurance component P (1, 1, T, r, δ, σ)
which is subtracted from annuity A (r, T) in the denominator. This increases the maximal
annual payment R¯CWM relative to RFRM. On the other hand we expect the value of the
embedded option to default, appearing in the numerator, to be lower for the CWM
DCWM (1, 0) < DFRM (1, 0) (76)
and to reduce the annual payment R¯CWM as a result, relative to the FRM.
Our numerical analysis shows that the insurance effect dominates the default option ef-
fect. That is, the maximal annual payment of the CWM is above the constant annual
payment of the FRM. However, under many scenarios, the decrease in the embedded
option to default is sufficiently prominent for the CWM to offer very affordable contract
rates which are only slightly higher than the contract rates of an FRM. This shows that at
least some part of the costs of the insurance against default can be financed by reducing
the incentives to rationally default when house prices decrease.
Payout rates δ reflect service provided by the property but also the speed of its deprecia-
tion relative to the growth of other assets in the economy. Consider a case where interest
rates are are low and comparable to the service flow (r = δ = 2%). For the loan to value
ratio l = 95% (see Table 2) the contract rate of a CWM is only 2.550%, compared to 2.342%
for an otherwise identical FRM. When interest rates increase to r = 12%, the attractiveness
of the CWM is preserved. Contract rates follow the interest rate to 12.063% and 12.061%
for the CWM and the FRM, respectively. Meanwhile, their relative spread decreases by
two orders of magnitude, from 20.8 to only 0.2 basis points. Decreasing the loan to value
ratio to l = 90% widens the spread to 0.3 basis points and remains the same for l = 80%.
Consistent with option pricing theory, the spread between CWM and FRM loan rates
increases as the volatility of the house prices increases. In our example, when the house
price volatility increases from σ = 5% to 15% (see Table 4), FRM and CWM rates increase
to 12.384% and 12.457%, respectively, and therefore also become more wide apart (7.3
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FRM CWM
l r δ none low high none low high
0.95 0.02 0.02 2.342 2.27 1.639 2.55 2.477 1.839
0.06 3.609 3.532 2.855 6.03 5.943 5.165
0.12 4.725 4.642 3.921 12.063 11.944 10.837
0.06 0.02 6.034 5.948 5.169 6.043 5.956 5.178
0.06 6.328 6.24 5.448 6.608 6.518 5.714
0.12 7.94 7.843 6.972 12.071 11.952 10.845
0.12 0.02 12.061 11.942 10.836 12.063 11.944 10.838
0.06 12.068 11.949 10.843 12.076 11.957 10.85
0.12 12.367 12.246 11.12 12.751 12.627 11.478
0.9 0.02 0.02 2.256 2.184 1.556 2.534 2.462 1.824
0.06 3.526 3.449 2.775 6.03 5.943 5.165
0.12 4.666 4.584 3.865 12.063 11.944 10.837
0.06 0.02 6.018 5.932 5.154 6.031 5.944 5.166
0.06 6.229 6.141 5.354 6.603 6.513 5.708
0.12 7.828 7.732 6.867 12.071 11.952 10.845
0.12 0.02 12.06 11.941 10.835 12.063 11.944 10.837
0.06 12.061 11.942 10.836 12.071 11.952 10.845
0.12 12.244 12.124 11.006 12.751 12.627 11.478
0.8 0.02 0.02 2.136 2.065 1.44 2.534 2.462 1.824
0.06 3.358 3.282 2.614 6.03 5.943 5.165
0.12 4.543 4.462 3.748 12.063 11.944 10.837
0.06 0.02 6.015 5.928 5.151 6.03 5.943 5.165
0.06 6.108 6.021 5.239 6.603 6.513 5.708
0.12 7.606 7.511 6.657 12.071 11.952 10.845
0.12 0.02 12.06 11.941 10.835 12.063 11.944 10.837
0.06 12.06 11.941 10.835 12.071 11.952 10.845
0.12 12.121 12.001 10.891 12.751 12.627 11.478
Table 2: Equilibrium contract rates v.s. prepayment intensity and cost. r¯c[%] p.a.
monthly compounded. House price volatility σ = 5%, mortgage term T = 30 years,
points pi = 0. Prepayment intensity and cost: λ = 0, φ = 0 (none), λ = 1/year, φ = 1%
(low), λ = 10/year, φ = 10% (high).
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FRM CWM
l r δ none low high none low high
0.95 0.02 0.02 2.776 2.702 2.056 3.253 3.178 2.514
0.06 3.787 3.709 3.025 6.185 6.098 5.313
0.12 4.793 4.71 3.986 12.097 11.977 10.869
0.06 0.02 6.255 6.167 5.379 6.335 6.247 5.455
0.06 6.765 6.674 5.862 7.358 7.264 6.423
0.12 8.106 8.008 7.128 12.188 12.068 10.954
0.12 0.02 12.145 12.025 10.914 12.163 12.043 10.931
0.06 12.251 12.13 11.012 12.31 12.189 11.068
0.12 12.846 12.721 11.565 13.587 13.458 12.254
0.9 0.02 0.02 2.68 2.606 1.963 3.148 3.073 2.413
0.06 3.707 3.629 2.949 6.185 6.098 5.313
0.12 4.736 4.654 3.932 12.097 11.977 10.869
0.06 0.02 6.166 6.078 5.294 6.254 6.166 5.378
0.06 6.643 6.553 5.746 7.256 7.163 6.327
0.12 7.997 7.9 7.026 12.188 12.068 10.954
0.12 0.02 12.089 11.969 10.862 12.114 11.994 10.885
0.06 12.155 12.035 10.923 12.229 12.109 10.992
0.12 12.677 12.554 11.409 13.503 13.375 12.177
0.8 0.02 0.02 2.509 2.436 1.799 3.119 3.044 2.386
0.06 3.545 3.468 2.794 6.185 6.098 5.313
0.12 4.616 4.535 3.818 12.097 11.977 10.869
0.06 0.02 6.069 5.982 5.203 6.194 6.106 5.321
0.06 6.441 6.352 5.555 7.247 7.154 6.318
0.12 7.779 7.683 6.82 12.188 12.068 10.954
0.12 0.02 12.063 11.944 10.838 12.097 11.978 10.87
0.06 12.081 11.962 10.854 12.19 12.07 10.956
0.12 12.424 12.303 11.174 13.503 13.375 12.177
Table 3: Equilibrium contract rates v.s. prepayment intensity and cost. r¯c[%] p.a.
monthly compounded. House price volatility σ = 10%, mortgage term T = 30 years,
points pi = 0. Prepayment intensity and cost: λ = 0, φ = 0 (none), λ = 1/year, φ = 1%
(low), λ = 10/year, φ = 10% (high).
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FRM CWM
l r δ none low high none low high
0.95 0.02 0.02 3.19 3.115 2.453 4.031 3.952 3.259
0.06 4.017 3.938 3.245 6.578 6.489 5.686
0.12 4.897 4.813 4.085 12.22 12.1 10.984
0.06 0.02 6.614 6.524 5.719 6.89 6.799 5.981
0.06 7.194 7.101 6.268 8.203 8.105 7.221
0.12 8.333 8.234 7.343 12.508 12.386 11.252
0.12 0.02 12.384 12.263 11.136 12.457 12.335 11.204
0.06 12.605 12.483 11.342 12.821 12.697 11.543
0.12 13.333 13.205 12.017 14.555 14.42 13.151
0.9 0.02 0.02 3.098 3.023 2.365 3.892 3.815 3.127
0.06 3.943 3.864 3.174 6.566 6.477 5.674
0.12 4.842 4.759 4.033 12.22 12.1 10.984
0.06 0.02 6.496 6.406 5.607 6.765 6.675 5.863
0.06 7.072 6.979 6.152 8.046 7.949 7.074
0.12 8.229 8.13 7.245 12.508 12.386 11.252
0.12 0.02 12.258 12.138 11.019 12.339 12.218 11.095
0.06 12.452 12.33 11.2 12.674 12.551 11.406
0.12 13.153 13.026 11.85 14.372 14.238 12.982
0.8 0.02 0.02 2.922 2.847 2.196 3.76 3.683 3.
0.06 3.79 3.712 3.028 6.566 6.477 5.674
0.12 4.727 4.644 3.923 12.22 12.1 10.984
0.06 0.02 6.312 6.224 5.433 6.62 6.53 5.725
0.06 6.847 6.755 5.939 7.951 7.855 6.984
0.12 8.018 7.92 7.046 12.508 12.386 11.252
0.12 0.02 12.128 12.009 10.898 12.242 12.122 11.004
0.06 12.251 12.131 11.013 12.538 12.416 11.28
0.12 12.843 12.718 11.562 14.323 14.189 12.936
Table 4: Equilibrium contract rates v.s. prepayment intensity and cost. r¯c[%] p.a.
monthly compounded. House price volatility σ = 15%, mortgage term T = 30 years,
points pi = 0. Prepayment intensity and cost: λ = 0, φ = 0 (none), λ = 1/year, φ = 1%
(low), λ = 10/year, φ = 10% (high).
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basis points, from 0.2). When interest rates fall to 2%, the gap widens (84.1 basis points
for σ = 15%) and is wider than in the low volatility case (20.8 basis points for σ = 5%).
Conversely, when δ is high relative to r, the building loses value at a higher rate and in
such circumstances even the FRMs have contract rates significantly above the prevailing
interest rates. For example this happens when δ = 12% and r = 2%. For l = 95% the
FRM contract rate is 4.725%, so well above the 2%, but increases to 12.063% for a CWM
(see again Table 2). This is because in such economic conditions the CWM contract rate
predominantly reflects the price of insuring against house price decline and the decline
rate is imposed to occur at the rate of 12% per annum via the coefficient δ. Interestingly,
by lowering the loan to value l to 80%, it is possible to slightly lower the FRM rate to
4.543%, but the CWM rate stays put at 12.063%.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 also provide the equilibrium contract rates when the prepayment risk
is present (λ > 0) and taken into consideration when designing the loan. The latter is
implemented by imposing some prepayment penalties (φ > 0) in the form of percentage
of the value prepaid. We consider two scenarios: one where prepayment risk and penal-
ties are moderate (λ = 1/year, φ = 1%); and a more extreme situation, where customers
are very impatient to prepay (λ = 10/year) but are strongly penalised when doing so
(φ = 10%). Not surprisingly, we observe that it is possible to impose prepayment penal-
ties high enough so as to offer “attractive” contract rates below the current interest rate
level. For example when when the house price volatility is low enough (σ = 5%) and
when r = δ = 2% we get 1.639% and 1.839% for FRM and CWM, respectively. See Table
2. However, when volatility increases to σ = 10% and 15% (see Tables 3 and 4, respec-
tively) contract rates rise above r = 2%, even with imposition of prepayment costs.
4.4 CWM v.s. FRM embedded default option values
In Tables 5, 6 and 7 we compute the values of embedded put options to default as a
percentage fraction of the initial value, Q0, of the loan granted. Because H0 = 1, Q0 is
numerically equal to l, the loan to value ratio, i.e. in tables we effectively report DFRM/l
and DCWM/l. This is for easier comparisons, per dollar of loan granted, between scenar-
ios with different l-s. These values are consistent with CWM and FRM contract rates we
discovered in the previous section.
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CWM’s embedded default option values tend to be several orders of magnitude lower
than FRM’s. This is most prominent where the service flow is high compared to the
interest rate, e.g. δ = 12% and r = 2%. In this region the put option values are virtually
zero for CWMs but highest for FRMs. Moreover, and consistently for all l-s and any
prepayment scenario, values of options to default embedded in FRMs always rise with
increasing service δ. However, the latter cannot be said of CWMs where the effect of δ is
not always monotone, suggesting some non-proportional interplay going on.
To understand these effects we observe that when the service flow is rising, two opposite
effects can happen. Higher “rent” δ extracted from the property causes faster house price
decline and thus precipitates the rational default. On the other hand, the early default
boundary ξFRM retracts because it is now more interesting to keep the property in order to
extract that rent, as opposed to rationally default and invest (unpaid) mortgage payments
at the riskless rate r.
For example, when σ = 5% and l = 95% our computations show that for r = δ =
2% the early default boundaries at time t = 0 are at ξFRM ≈ 0.80 and ξCWM ≈ 0.76,
respectively. If δ moves to 12%, the FRM boundary retracts to ξFRM ≈ 0.29. For the
FRM, the declining price effect thus dominates because the default option value increases
in value 10-fold, from 4.654 to 40.525 percent of the initial loan value (see again Table
5). In contrast, for the CWM, the default option is only worth 0.203 which is almost 20
times less than for the FRM. This is at first puzzling. However, further inspection of the
early exercise boundaries reveals that while both start very close together at time t = 0,
the FRM’s boundary declines slowly to reach 0 at maturity T = 30, while the CWM’s
boundary sharply declines to zero within the first year or so (see Figures 10 and 11).15
This explains the very low value of the CWM’s embedded options. With boundary flat
at zero any rational default beyond year 1 is highly improbable. This effect becomes
larger when we move δ to 12% because the boundary becomes all flat equal to zero from
time t = 0, meaning that CWM practically eliminates all rational defaults (see Figure 12).
However, while early defaults and the embedded put are eliminated, contract rates of
the CWM are much higher (see again Table 2). This reflects the high costs of insurance
against house price decline when service rate, and thus the rate of decay of the structure,
are high, meaning lower house values and rational defaults are more likely in future.
15Our finding is consistent with Ambrose and Buttimer (2012) who find zero default option values after
36 months in the quarterly updated variant of their ABM mortgage.
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FRM CWM
l r δ none low high none low high
0.95 0.02 0.02 4.654 4.654 4.654 0.203 0.203 0.203
0.06 23.034 23.034 23.034 0. 0. 0.
0.12 40.525 40.525 40.525 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.144 0.144 0.144
0.06 3.366 3.366 3.366 0.055 0.055 0.055
0.12 21.399 21.399 21.399 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.039 0.04 0.04
0.12 2.279 2.279 2.279 0. 0. 0.
0.9 0.02 0.02 3.461 3.461 3.461 0. 0. 0.
0.06 21.772 21.772 21.772 0. 0. 0.
0.12 39.582 39.582 39.582 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.015 0.015 0.015
0.06 2.293 2.293 2.293 0. 0. 0.
0.12 20.113 20.113 20.113 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.12 1.367 1.367 1.367 0. 0. 0.
0.8 0.02 0.02 1.816 1.816 1.816 0. 0. 0.
0.06 19.258 19.258 19.258 0. 0. 0.
0.12 37.603 37.603 37.603 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.001 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.994 0.994 0.994 0. 0. 0.
0.12 17.572 17.572 17.572 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.449 0.449 0.449 0. 0. 0.
Table 5: Embedded default put option values for different prepayment scenarios.
DFRMDCWM[%] of the initial loan value Q0. House price volatility σ = 5%, mortgage
term T = 30 years, points pi = 0. Prepayment intensity and cost: λ = 0, φ = 0 (none),
λ = 1/year, φ = 1% (low), λ = 10/year, φ = 10% (high).
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FRM CWM
l r δ none low high none low high
0.95 0.02 0.02 10.757 10.757 10.757 1.701 1.702 1.702
0.06 25.738 25.738 25.738 0. 0. 0.
0.12 41.637 41.637 41.637 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 2.577 2.577 2.577 1.587 1.588 1.589
0.06 8.134 8.134 8.134 1.102 1.103 1.103
0.12 23.315 23.315 23.315 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.49 0.491 0.491
0.06 1.415 1.415 1.415 0.9 0.901 0.901
0.12 5.862 5.862 5.862 0.571 0.573 0.573
0.9 0.02 0.02 9.387 9.387 9.387 0.362 0.363 0.363
0.06 24.521 24.521 24.521 0. 0. 0.
0.12 40.715 40.715 40.715 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 1.613 1.613 1.613 0.723 0.724 0.724
0.06 6.796 6.796 6.796 0.093 0.093 0.093
0.12 22.058 22.058 22.058 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.127 0.127 0.127
0.06 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.304 0.305 0.305
0.12 4.598 4.598 4.598 0. 0. 0.
0.8 0.02 0.02 6.977 6.977 6.977 0. 0. 0.
0.06 22.065 22.065 22.065 0. 0. 0.
0.12 38.777 38.777 38.777 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.087 0.087 0.087
0.06 4.594 4.594 4.594 0. 0. 0.
0.12 19.549 19.549 19.549 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.005 0.005 0.005
0.06 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.016 0.016 0.016
0.12 2.709 2.709 2.709 0. 0. 0.
Table 6: Embedded default put option values for different prepayment scenarios.
DFRMDCWM[%] of the initial loan value Q0. House price volatility σ = 10%, mortgage
term T = 30 years, points pi = 0. Prepayment intensity and cost: λ = 0, φ = 0 (none),
λ = 1/year, φ = 1% (low), λ = 10/year, φ = 10% (high).
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FRM CWM
l r δ none low high none low high
0.95 0.02 0.02 16.77 16.77 16.77 3.327 3.329 3.329
0.06 29.295 29.295 29.295 0.125 0.126 0.126
0.12 43.326 43.326 43.326 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 6.476 6.476 6.476 3.364 3.366 3.367
0.06 12.916 12.916 12.916 2.394 2.396 2.397
0.12 25.96 25.96 25.96 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 2.406 2.406 2.406 1.745 1.746 1.747
0.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 2.268 2.271 2.272
0.12 9.527 9.527 9.527 1.517 1.519 1.521
0.9 0.02 0.02 15.424 15.424 15.424 1.621 1.622 1.623
0.06 28.141 28.141 28.141 0. 0. 0.
0.12 42.436 42.436 42.436 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 5.185 5.185 5.185 2.064 2.065 2.066
0.06 11.544 11.544 11.544 0.901 0.902 0.903
0.12 24.747 24.747 24.747 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 1.471 1.471 1.471 0.875 0.877 0.877
0.06 2.916 2.916 2.916 1.198 1.2 1.201
0.12 8.167 8.167 8.167 0.322 0.324 0.324
0.8 0.02 0.02 12.855 12.855 12.855 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.06 25.781 25.781 25.781 0. 0. 0.
0.12 40.562 40.562 40.562 0. 0. 0.
0.06 0.02 3.195 3.195 3.195 0.557 0.558 0.558
0.06 9.039 9.039 9.039 0. 0. 0.
0.12 22.297 22.297 22.297 0. 0. 0.
0.12 0.02 0.504 0.504 0.504 0.163 0.163 0.164
0.06 1.417 1.417 1.417 0.215 0.216 0.216
0.12 5.838 5.838 5.838 0. 0. 0.
Table 7: Embedded default put option values for different prepayment scenarios.
DFRMDCWM[%] of the initial loan value Q0. House price volatility σ = 15%, mortgage
term T = 30 years, points pi = 0. Prepayment intensity and cost: λ = 0, φ = 0 (none),
λ = 1/year, φ = 1% (low), λ = 10/year, φ = 10% (high).
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Figure 10: Early default boundaries of a CWM as a function of time to maturity t. Ser-
vice flow ratios: δ = 2% (thick line), δ = 6% (dashed, thick), δ = 12% (thin). Interest
rate r = 6%, house price volatility σ = 5%, prepayment intensity λ = 0, prepayment cost
φ = 0, points pi = 0.
5 Data and calibration of house price index paths
We use S&P/Case-Shiller home price index. The “10-city” composite 318 not season-
ally adjusted monthly observations starts in January 1987. We also check our estimates
against the “20-city” composite, which is a shorter series with 162 monthly observations,
starting in January 2000. Both series are normalized to 100 in January 2000 and span
the period up until July 2013. Before proceeding we check for unit roots. Before using
calibrated parameters in simulations we validate them against estimates obtained using
a much longer time series data. This series, which we short name “Shiller”, has been
originally used to produce illustrations in Irrational Exuberance (Shiller (2005)) and Sub-
prime Solution (Shiller (2008b)) books. It is regularly updated and available for download
at www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/. It has annual observations of nominal and real
home price indices from 1892 till 1952. Observations are then monthly. Either interpolat-
ing data pre-1953 or annualizing post-1952 sample we obtain similar results. We therefore
only report results from interpolated data.
44
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t
FR
M
Early Default Boundaries : FRM
Figure 11: Early default boundaries of a FRM as a function of time to maturity t. Service
flow ratios: δ = 2% (thick line), δ = 6% (dashed, thick), δ = 12% (thin). Interest rate
r = 6%, house price volatility σ = 5%, prepayment intensity λ = 0, prepayment cost
φ = 0, points pi = 0.
Using detailed data and tools researchers revealed inefficiencies in house prices (see e.g.
Case and Shiller (1989), Tirtiroglu (1992)), structural breaks (see Canarella et al. (2012)),
market segmentation (Montas and Olmos (2013)) and ripple effects (UK: Meen (1999)
and US: Canarella et al. (2012)). There is, however, evidence in favour of unit roots in
house price index capital gains. Canarella et al. (2012), for example, confirm unit roots in
logarithmic differentials of seasonally adjusted regional S&P/Case–Shiller indices for 10
US cities, including the 10-city composite. If unit roots are present in these time series we
must have φ = 1 in the following regression
∆yt = α+ βt + (φ− 1) yt−1 + et . (77)
This means that the change in the capital gain ∆yt = yt − yt−1, where yt = ln ξt, does
not depend on the capital gain at t− 1. In other words y follows an arithmetic Brownian
motion. Taking exponential gives
ξt ≈ ξt−1eα+βt+et . (78)
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Figure 12: Embedded default put option values as a function of service flow ratio δ.
Thick line: CWM. Dashed line: FRM. Log-scale. Interest rate r = 6%, house price volatility
σ = 5%, prepayment intensity λ = 0, prepayment cost φ = 0, points pi = 0.
10-city 20-city Shiller Simulations
1987- 2000- 1890-
µˆ 0.0395166 0.0367472 0.0310475 0.03
σˆ 0.0325394 0.0397048 0.0404518 0.01–0.10
Table 8: S&P/Case-Shiller home price index calibration.
Therefore, as a first approximation, we could assume that the house price index is log-
normally distributed. Consequently, in a first attempt to model the random behaviour of
the house price index we calibrate a geometric Brownian motion for drift and volatility.
Also, because of a possible bias toward nonrejection of the unit root hypothesis in season-
ally adjusted data (see Ghysels and Perron (1993)), before proceeding we first check for
unit roots using non seasonally adjusted and longer time series data. The results of our
calibration are reported in Table 8.
We set µ close to the long term trend 3% per annum and we do not retain a particular
value for the volatility in our simulations. As observed from a longer perspective, volatil-
ity is on average somewhere between 3% and 4% (see Figure 1). However, we adopt a
broader range in our simulations. Historically, there were periods of higher and lower
46
volatility. Using interpolated annual data (pre 1953) and quarterly data (post 1953), a
moving volatility estimate is obtained, quarter by quarter. Each estimate is using 40 most
recent quarterly observations spanning the last 10 years. This is illustrated on Figure 1.
6 Comparing Continuous Workouts with Fixed Rates
It is difficult to uniquely say what would constitute a good mortgage product. Every
prospective homeowner will apply different criteria so it is safer to consider a range of
alternative cases and specific situations. To establish when a risk averse mortgagor will be
most likely to prefer CWM to FRM we employ a utility-based argument. Borrowers who
are unable to dynamically adjust their portfolios, so as to finance their home purchase
directly on financial markets, must choose either a CWM or an FRM i.e. they cannot use
a mix of two smaller mortgages. Denote this choice by m ∈ {CWM, FRM}.
6.1 Intertemporal utilities
Recognizing the fact that mortgage payments occur monthly, intertemporal utilities can
be represented as discrete sums. A risk-averse mortgagor maximizes
max
m∈{FRM,CWM}
Um = E
360
∑
i=1
exp
{
−ρ i
12
}
u
(
S−Ym
(
i
12
))
(79)
over the term T = 36012 = 30 years, where ρ is the subjective discount rate, S are the funds
available (salary) and Ym (t) is the mortgage payment at time t = i12 . We also require
S > Ym (t) for all t. This is readily achieved for FRM for which YFRM (t) = RFRM by
requiring S > RFRM initially. Using RFRM given by (68) we obtain16
UFRM =
30
∑
n=1
exp {−ρn} u
(
S− RFRM
)
≈ A (ρ, T) u
(
S− RFRM
)
. (80)
Note that because payments are all constant, known in advance from the moment when
the contract is signed, FRM removes all randomness other than prepayment and default.
16To simplify notation in what follows we use years n = 1 . . . 30 rather than months i = 1 . . . 360 as the
summation grid.
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Both the prepayment and default risk have been included into the computation of the
annual payment RFRM.
In contrast, CWM payments are capped by R¯CWM > RFRM, but the mortgagor doesn’t
know their amounts in advance. Therefore, for the CWM we compute the expected utility
which is a function of the future evolution of the house price index ξ
UCWM = E
30
∑
n=1
exp {−ρn} u
(
S− RCWM (ξn)
)
. (81)
CWM dynamically aligns the outstanding loan balance to changes in collateral value
by “controlling” the repayment flow RCWM (ξn). Expectations in (81) require the “real
world” probability P . This means we specify information about the actual drift µ of
house prices. If the utility of consumption is of constant relative risk aversion type
u (c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ , (82)
then γ is the risk aversion parameter. For γ = 0 the individual is risk-neutral and γ = 1
corresponds to logarithmic utility.
6.2 Simulation results
Expectations in (81) can be evaluated by numerical integration under the real-world prob-
ability P . We check our results against monthly simulations over 30 years, where one
path requires 360 points drawn from a normal distribution. Each path determines inter-
mediate and terminal cash-flows of the CWM mortgage. After simulating many paths
we compute sample average utilities and stop simulations when results stop changing
significantly. We repeat expected utility computations for different parameter values.
An individual is planning to acquire a home over a 30-years horizon. There is choice
between an FRM and a CWM mortgage, both priced including default and prepayment
risks. When computing FRM and CWM contract rates to be offered, respectively rFRMc and
rCWMc , lenders take into account borrower’s optimal default and prepayment decisions.
We set the annual wage S to a constant value of 20% (i.e. 1/5th) of the original house price
H0 = 1. The mortgagor relative risk-aversion γ vary in the range from 0.1 to 3.7 and the
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rate of intertemporal impatience ρ from 1% to 28%. We compute the net dollar welfare
gain, defined as
Net Gain =
30
∑
n
PV ($-equivalent Gain (n))−
30
∑
n
E [PV (Cost (n, ξ))] (83)
where the $-equivalent gain
$-equivalent Gain (n) = RFRM − RˆFRM (84)
refers to the annual dollar amount, in year n, by which the payment of an FRM should be
lowered for the fixed rate borrower to enjoy the same welfare level as a holder of a CWM.
In our simulations the dollar-equivalent gain (84) turns out to always be positive, for all
ranges of parameters considered. We compute UFRM (analytically) and UCWM (numeri-
cally) and then solve for RˆFRM. The cost in year n is
Cost (n, ξ) = RCWM (ξ)− RFRM (85)
That is, the difference between an actual CWM payment and an FRM payment. This cost
may become a gain, i.e. Cost(n, ξ) < 0 when house prices are in relative decline. Under
such circumstances the house price index ξ is low, RCWM (ξ) is below RFRM and CWM
pays off, compared to an otherwise identical but more expensive FRM. As required, we
discount riskless cash flows at the riskless rate r and the risky cash flows, which are all
related to the random CWM payments RCWM (ξ), at the contract rate discount rate rCWMc .
Below we briefly report and comment on the typical numerical results we obtain within
our framework.
Empirical studies have confirmed constant relative risk-aversion. Coefficient estimates
consistently range from 1 to 4 with average γ close to 2 (see e.g. Szpiro (1986b), Szpiro
(1986a) and Chiappori and Paiella (2011)). In our simulations we change the value of γ in
the range 0 < γ < 5. It turns out our results are not very sensitive to the degree of risk
aversion, therefore we set γ to 2.1, which is closest to 2 on our grid.
Capital gain or loss on house prices is an important factor for buyers to engage in taking
up or defaulting on mortgage loans. Therefore, in our setup, the net gains in equation
(83) are sensitive to whether house prices are perceived, in the real world, as relatively
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decreasing (µ < r − δ) or increasing (µ > r − δ). Therefore we set r − δ to 4% (r = 6%
and δ = 2%) and we present two sets of outcomes, one for which µ = 1% and another
for µ = 7%. The net gains are also quite sensitive to house price volatility. Therefore, in
Figures 13 and 14 we consider σ’s equal to 5% (thin line), 10% (dashed line) and 15% (thick
line). Figure 13 shows that when house prices are expected to be relatively decreasing
(µ = 1%), the CWM appears to be most attractive. For high levels of volatility (σ =
15%) a patient household (ρ = 1% p.a.) expects to achieve more than a $30, 000 dollar-
equivalent gain by choosing a CWM over an FRM, when purchasing a $100, 000 house.
Not surprisingly, the relative advantage of the CWM diminishes when the outlook for
house prices improves (µ = 7%). This decreases the net gains (from $30, 000 to just below
$7, 000 when σ = 15%) but does not deter even the more myopic households, or when
the volatility is low (σ = 5%), from preferring CWMs to FRMs. See again Figure 14.
A more realistic numerical simulation would include adding more dimensions to our
model, but would invariably render computations less tractable. We leave these impor-
tant dimensions for future research. They could include: (a) parametrizing how good a
saver the prospective homeowner is e.g. the proportion of disposable income saved af-
ter paying off the mortgage;17 (b) parametrizing the housing rental market through the
lifetime and modeling its impact on default and/or prepayment decisions; (c) specifying
whether or not the homeowner can move back to the starting point (e.g. parent’s house
where they lived before taking on the mortgage) in case they decide to optimally default;
(d) specifying a cap on maximal number of defaults or prepayments during the lifetime
and the role of credit rating agencies; (e) specifying the proportion of total population
who actually optimally default; (f) specifying whether the borrowers intend to stay in
the property or to move into a retirement accommodation after reaching the mortgage
maturity; etc.
Finally, we add the following disclaimer as our model encapsulates the key features but
in a very simple way. In the real world an increase in volatility of house prices, for exam-
ple, would impact the level or volatility of incomes (and vice versa). As a result, when
incomes are fixed, and especially when the house price volatility is high, the more risk-
averse homeowners may, perversely, perceive CWMs as more risky because these con-
tracts require payments which vary with the level of house prices. Instead, some buyers
17This could be used, for example, for prepaying and acquiring the property earlier than originally
planned, if a random prepayment event occurs before maturity. See Section 4.
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Figure 13: Net dollar gain of a CWM v.s. FRM: decreasing house prices. House price
trend µ = 1%. Riskless rate r = 6%, service parameter δ = 2%. House price volatilities:
σ = 5% (thin line), 10% (dashed line) and 15% (thick line).
may prefer locking in the comfort of the fixed monthly payments that the FRMs provide.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper shows how to mitigate the fragility of the economy to plain vanilla mort-
gages by advocating Continuous Workout Mortgages (CWMs). As pointed out by Shiller
(2008b), Shiller (2008a) and Shiller (2009), these are related to Price Level Adjusting Mort-
gages (PLAMs), recommended by Modigliani (1974) for high inflation regimes. CWMs
share some positive attributes with PLAMs (such as purchasing power risk) and mitigate
other negative attributes (such as default risk, interest rate risk and prepayment risk). The
liquidity risk can be alleviated by employing CWMs in sufficient volume to warrant their
securitization.
Our approach is consistent with the literature even though we have not used an equi-
librium based interest model like the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) to motivate pre-
payments. We adopt the intensity framework of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) for random
prepayments instead. The novelty of our CWM ensues by going beyond the ABM of
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Figure 14: Net dollar gain of a CWM v.s. FRM: increasing house prices. House price
trend µ = 7%. Riskless rate r = 6%, service parameter δ = 2%. House price volatilities:
σ = 5% (thin line), 10% (dashed line) and 15% (thick line).
Ambrose and Buttimer (2012) by resurrecting it as a non-cumulative income bond.
We evaluate the CWM contract relying on assumptions of option pricing techniques. In
this framework speculators are necessary to enable risk to be shifted from hedgers at
the correct (arbitrage-free) price. The arbitrage-free price is ensured by a simultaneous
presence of arbitrageurs in the market for homes and/or derivative claims contingent on
house prices.
Hybrid facilities such as CWMs mitigate risk shifting aspect of agency cost of debt through
their structure, and thus deter defaults. Hybrids like preferred stock and income bonds
have played a vital role in the development of countries like the USA (Evans Jr., 1929; Fis-
cher and Wilt Jr., 1968; McConnell and Schlarbaum, 1981). Preferred stocks have still
thrived through the ages while income bonds have withered (McConnell and Schlar-
baum, 1981; Kalberg and Villopuram, 2013). The rationale behind this is given by Stiglitz
(1989), who attributes the demise of income bonds is due to the ‘contingent income’ ma-
nipulation by firms. From this perspective, the CWM discussed in our paper can be seen
as an attempt to resurrect a non-cumulative income bond in the context of housing fi-
nance, by ensuring that there is no underlying asset manipulation by homeowners. We
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do this by recommending a CWM contingent on the local house price index (instead of
the asset i.e. the borrower’s house value).
We evaluated the expected utility of the mortgagor by using the expected utility func-
tion (81). This captures the welfare from the demand side of loans. Our results reveal a
substantial welfare gain to creating CWMs. In our simulations CWMs appear to be more
attractive than FRMs at current volatility levels and for typical values of risk aversion. At
these levels agents prefer CWMs to FRMs.
The results of our simulations are encouraging, because measured welfare gains are pos-
itive. However, we do not advocate CWMs for everybody. As any insurance product,
CWMs may turn out to be costly. If only good times occur in future, the embedded in-
surance premia will have to be paid making CWMs more expensive ex post, compared to
FRMs.
The linear design considered here is appealing by its simplicity and should be easy to
explain to a customer. Non-linear and potentially more efficient designs should also be
possible.18 We conjecture that experimenting with these designs should result in an even
better immunization against the default risk. However, we leave these experiments for
future research.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of equations (9) and (10)
Between s = 0 and s = t the dynamics of QCWM−s is given by
dQCWM−s
ds
= rQCWM−s − RCWM (ξs) (86)
For initial condition QCWM0 = Q0 we have observed ξs up to time t > s, therefore this ODE has
solution
QCWM−t = Q0e
rt −
∫ t
0
RCWM (ξs) er(t−s) ds (87)
= Q0ert −
∫ t
0
R¯CWM min {1, ξs} er(t−s) ds (88)
= Q0ert −
∫ t
0
R¯CWM
[
1− (1− ξs)+
]
er(t−s) ds (89)
= Q0ert − R¯CWM
∫ t
0
er(t−s) ds + R¯CWM
∫ t
0
(1− ξs)+ er(t−s)ds (90)
= Q0ert − R¯CWM e
rt − 1
r
+ R¯CWM
∫ t
0
(1− ξs)+ er(t−s)ds (91)
=
[
Q0 − R¯CWM A (r, t)
]
ert + R¯CWM
∫ t
0
(1− ξs)+ er(t−s)ds (92)
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In particular note that considering two limiting cases ξs → 0 and ξs ≥ 1 (or ξs → +∞) for all
s ∈ [0, t] we conclude that there must be a lower and an upper bound to QCWM−t[
Q0 − R¯CWM A (r, t)
]
ert ≤ QCWM−t ≤ Q0ert .
When R¯CWM > RFRM = Q0A(r,T) and for t close to maturity T, the lower bound can become a
negative number, because of the strict inequality in
Q0 − R¯CWM A (r, t) < Q0 − Q0A (r, T)A (r, t) = Q0
[
1− A (r, t)
A (r, T)
]
t→T−→ 0 . (93)
A.2 Proof of equation (12) in Proposition 1
Using (6) in (8) we obtain
QCWM+t = Et
[∫ T
t
R¯CWM
[
1− (1− ξs)+
]
e−r(s−t)ds
]
(94)
= R¯CWM
{
A (r, T − t)−
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)Et
[
(1− ξs)+
]
ds
}
. (95)
We notice that the second term is a time integral of time t Black-Scholes put options with maturities
within interval s ∈ [t, T], each with strike price normalized to one. Because ξt follows a geometric
Brownian motion under the martingale measure, with starting point normalized to ξ0 = 1, so that
ξs = exp
{(
r− δ− σ
2
2
)
s + σZs
}
= ξt exp
{(
r− δ− σ
2
2
)
(s− t) + σ (Zs − Zt)
}
, (96)
it is possible to obtain a closed form solution. For other distributions (e.g. empirically inferred) of
the underlying our analysis still holds but the time integral will need to be evaluated numerically.
It follows that∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)Et
[
(1− ξs)+
]
ds = P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ) (97)
where P is the floor function: see Appendix B. Combining (97) and (94) gives (12) and proves
Proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of equation (32)
We have
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∫ T
t
λe−(r+λ)(s−t)Et [P (ξs, 1, T − s, r, δ, σ)] ds = (98)
=
∫ T
t
λe−(λ+r)(s−t)Et
[∫ T
s
e−r(u−s)Es
[
(1− ξu)+
]
du
]
ds
=
∫ T
t
λe−(λ+r)(s−t)Et
[
Es
[∫ T
s
e−r(u−s) (1− ξu)+ du
]]
ds
= λEt
∫ T
t
e−(λ+r)(s−t)
∫ T
s
e−r(u−s) (1− ξu)+ duds
= λe(r+λ)tEt
∫ T
t
∫ T
s
e−λs−ru (1− ξu)+ duds
= λe(r+λ)tEt
∫ T
t
e−ru (1− ξu)+
(∫ u
t
e−λsds
)
du
= λe(r+λ)tEt
∫ T
t
e−ru (1− ξu)+
[
− e
−λs
λ
]u
t
du
= λe(r+λ)tEt
∫ T
t
e−ru (1− ξu)+ e
−λt − e−λu
λ
du
= e(r+λ)tEt
∫ T
t
e−ru (1− ξu)+
(
e−λt − e−λu
)
du
= Et
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) (1− ξu)+ du− Et
∫ T
t
e−(r+λ)(u−t) (1− ξu)+ du
= P (ξt, 1, T − t, r, δ, σ)− P (ξt, 1, T − t, r + λ, δ+ λ, σ)
where we changed the order of integration in double integrals and used the tower law for condi-
tional expectations and the following identity
− (λ+ r) (s− t)− r (u− s) = (r + λ) t− sλ− ru . (99)
B Floor flow option formula
Floors P on flow s with strike flow level k for finite horizon T can be computed using the following
closed-form formula (see Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007)):
P (s0, k, T, r, δ, σ) = Asa0 (1s0<k − N (−da))−
s0
δ
(
1s0<k − e−δT N (−d1)
)
(100)
+
k
r
(
1s0<k − e−rT N (−d0)
)
− Bsb0 (1s0<k − N (−db)) ,
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where
A =
k1−a
a− b
(
b
r
− b− 1
δ
)
, (101)
B =
k1−b
a− b
(
a
r
− a− 1
δ
)
,
and
a, b =
1
2
− r− δ
σ2
±
√(
r− δ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2
, (102)
whereas the cumulative normal integrals N (·) are labelled with parameters dβ
dβ =
ln s0 − ln k +
(
r− δ+ (β− 12) σ2) T
σ
√
T
(103)
(different to the standard textbook notation) for elasticity β which takes one of four values β ∈
{a, b, 0, 1}.
Standard Black and Scholes (1973) put on S with strike value of K can be computed using
p (S0, K, T, r, δ, σ) = Ke−rT N (−d0)− S0e−δT N (−d1) (104)
where d0 and d1 can be computed using formula (103) in which values S0 and K can (formally) be
used in place of flows s0 and k.
Both floor (100) and put (104) formulae assume that the underlying flow or asset x ∈ {s, S} is an
Itoˆ process driven by the equation
dxt
xt
= µxdt + σxdZt (105)
with initial value x0. When µx = r− δ and σx = σ, (105) describes a geometric Brownian motion
under the risk-neutral measure where Zt is the standard Brownian motion, σ is the volatility, r is
the riskless rate and δ is the service flow. In particular we assume that (105) then describes the
dynamics of the repayment flow s. Similarly, (105) also defines the dynamics of the value S of
the real estate property. By the Feynman-Kac theorem (see Kac (1949)) any contingent claim Ψ
on a basket of flows or assets x ∈ {x1 . . . xn} must then satisfy the following partial differential
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equation
1
2∑x ∑y
γxy
∂2Ψ
∂x∂y
+∑
x
µx
∂Ψ
∂x
+
∂Ψ
∂t
− rΨ = 0 (106)
with appropriate boundary conditions, where γxy = ∑k σxkσky : k, y ∈ {x1 . . . xn} and σxy are
elements of the variance-covariance matrix.
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